The Filipino economy is open to trade and capital inflows, and since 2002, has grown fast. Over the last 10 years, however, domestic investment, while stagnant in real terms, has shrunk as a share of GDP. In an open and growing economy, why the decline? Three reasons explain the puzzle. First, the public sector -constrained by fiscal pressures -cannot afford expanding its investment at GDP growth rates. Second, the capital-intensive private sector -discouraged by insufficient public investment and a high cost of inputs -does not find it convenient to raise investment at the economy's pace. Third, the fast-growing businesses in the service sector do not need to rapidly increase investment to enjoy rising profits. Yet, the economy keeps growing; and this is because its least protected sectors -the informal labor market and the non-capital-intensive activities -stimulate demand and drive supply. On the demand-side, massive labor migration results in remittances that fuel consumption-led-growth. On the supply-side, free from rent-capturing regulations, a few non-capital-intensive manufactures and services boost exports. The economic system is in equilibrium at a low-level of capital stock, where all economic agents have no incentive to unilaterally increase investment and the first-mover bears shortterm costs. As a consequence, growth is slower and less inclusive than it could be. To make it speedier and more sustainable, and to reduce unemployment and poverty, the economy needs to move to a "high-capital-stock" equilibrium -attainable through better-performing ecozones, a competitive exchange rate, greater Government revenues, and fewer élite-capturing regulations.
, led by the service sector. Over the last 15 years, however, domestic investment has been stagnant in real terms and consistently declining as a share of GDP.
2. Three reasons explain this puzzle: in the Philippines, investment does not grow at the pace of GDP because the public sector cannot afford it, the capital-intensive private sector does not want to expand that fast, and the rest of the private sector does not need it.
a. First, the public sector -constrained by serious fiscal pressures, due to decades of weak revenue performance, a weighty debt service and a high cost of inputs -cannot keep public investment growing at GDP growth rates; b. Second, the capital-intensive private sector does not find it convenient to expand investment at the economy's fast pace, as it expects little returns. The marginal product of capital (MPK) is low, for two reasons: i) the public sector does not invest enough to provide incentives for private investment; and ii) inputs are expensive because of élite-capture in the traditional sectors of the economy (agriculture, sea and air transport, power, cement, mining, banking, etc). There, the politically-connected corporate conglomerates -protected by favorable rules and regulations -enjoy barriers to entry and oligopolistic market power, and sell at a high price the products (agricultural commodities, transport services, electricity, cement, etc.) that are critical inputs for both upstream and downstream sectors. Also, they pay higher wagesrelative to other Asian countries -to the salaried insiders, thus securing "national labor peace" with their rents; and c. Third, the fast-growing businesses in the service sector -electronics assembly, voicebased business process outsourcing (BPO), and information and communication technology (ICT) -do not need to increase their investment at GDP growth rates to enjoy fast-rising profits.
3. Yet, despite the resulting decline in investment, the economy keeps growing; and this is because its least protected sectors -the informal labor market and the non-capital-intensive activities -stimulate demand and drive supply. On the demand-side, work-seekers -denied entry into the formal labor market -migrate massively to industrialized economies, attracted by better remuneration; the resulting remittances and transfers (which, combined, account for over 13 percent of GDP) fuel consumption-led-growth -and lower the penalty for élite-capturing policies. On the supply-side, the service sector and a few non-capital-intensive manufactures, free from rent-capturing regulations, boost exports.
4. In equilibrium at a low-level of capital stock. In the status quo, the well-protected corporate conglomerates take advantage of the political system to enjoy oligopolistic privileges -and then use the resulting rents to stabilize the economy. The resulting selfinterested political constituencies, in equilibrium, perpetuate the status quo. The economic agents have no incentives to unilaterally increase investment, because the first-mover will bear short-term costs: while the public sector faces macroeconomic fragility, the capitalintensive private sector is dealing with a low MPK. As a result, the economic system is in equilibrium at a "low-level of capital stock". In the short-medium term, low levels of investments are rational, and the "low-capital-stock" equilibrium is delivering economic growth, which -although not creating jobs (the unemployment rate is at almost 8 percent) -seems sustainable.
For future competitiveness, it is essential to reverse the present under-investment.
Indeed, it is difficult to see how, at present levels of investment, a sufficiently robust growth can be sustained in the longer term, which is essential to deal with the country's longer term development challenges (i.e., generate more jobs and reduce poverty). The country's growth potential is untapped because of today's inadequate investment. To reach speedier and more inclusive growth and sustain it in the long term, the country needs to address its lack of competitiveness. 10. Since 2002, growth has been higher than in the past. Over the past 40 years, the country struggled to raise economic growth (from its historical trend of 3.8 percent) above population growth (Figure 1 ). In 2002-06, the economy -driven by services -grew at 5.3 percent, well above its past performance 4 -but only average in its neighborhood (Table 1) . 11. As of the late 1990s, investment has been on a declining path. In almost all post-crisis economies of East Asia investment is far from pre-crisis levels 5 . However, since 1997, gross fixed investment in the Philippines has been stagnant in real terms and has declined as a share of GDP, thinning out to less than 15 percent ( Figure 1 and Figure 3 ).
The puzzle: an open and growing economy, but investment is declining
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1a. What's falling is domestic investment
12. The financial crisis took a toll on both public and private balance sheets. After 1997, revenue collection weakened 6 , the fiscal deficit increased sharply, and the central government debt rose to over 65 percent of GDP. Limited by these fiscal constraints and by a poor investment environment, gross fixed capital formation declined as a share of GDP to the lowest level in 20 years. Public capital spending moved in a pro-cyclical rather than a counter-cyclical direction, falling to an estimated 2.3 percent of GDP in 2004-05 (Figure 4 ).
The cuts in public investment led to under-investment in infrastructure and public education; the resulting deficiencies added to the ongoing decline in private investment.
5 Investment does not necessarily need to return to pre-crisis levels. In the early 1990s it may have been excessive, with resources allocated to lower return or unproductive projects, leading to a buildup of financial vulnerabilities. 6 The Government provided tax incentives and loosened tax administration. 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 China Korea Thailand Indonesia Philippines Malaysia 13. The investment decline is primarily due to lower domestic investment. Of the overall investment decline, domestic investment fell by 80 percent, while foreign investment decreased by 15 percent (Figure 4) . 7 Adding an element of rigidity to the downturn, 40 percent of the overall decline was due to lower construction ( Figure 5 ). 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 % GDP 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 % GDP Others Construction (public) Construction (private)
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Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, 2007 14. Private investment fell despite rising growth. The private sector found serious impediments to investing in the poor transportation network, the declining quality of education and the high cost of inputs, particularly electricity. accompanied by an enhanced tax effort. The improved outlook generated a more stable investment environment, potentially attractive for private capital inflows. Moreover, firmsin their fixed investment decisions -are today less influenced by the debt overhang, which constrained them during the late 1990s 10 . Also, the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) shows that in the post-crisis period investment efficiency has improved. 11 Finally, surveys indicate a greater propensity to invest, as average capacity utilization rates -mainly in the manufacturing sector -have increased to over 80 percent. 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 6 % GDP Aquino's assassination 10 Firms with high debt-asset ratios face higher premiums and rarely finance new investments externally. 11 The economy-wide ICOR is measured by the investment in a given period divided by the change in GDP in that period; it is also measured by the ratio of investment to GDP divided by the growth rate of GDP (World Bank, 2006a) . 12 This is suggesting private investment should pick up: with remittance-assisted personal consumption growing by more than 5 percent, firms would eventually need to increase investment to fulfill this demand. Moreover, consumer imports comprise less than 4 percent of GDP, whereas personal consumption accounts for 78 percent, indicating that the bulk of the increasing demand can be expected to be supplied by higher local production. 16. … but there is still little willingness to invest. Despite the more favorable environment, the savings-investment gap widened in recent years and the domestic appetite for investment remained stagnant (Table 2 and Figure 10 ). As a result of present growth and deficits, the "public debt-to-GDP ratio" is declining, but public investment has not picked up. The low and declining lending interest rate ( Figure 9 ) suggests that, in spite of the ample liquidity, the demand for credit is not increasing. Also, despite the favorable lending-deposit spread, banks are cautious in their lending to the private sector (Figure 12 ), preferring to finance the Government in local and foreign currency. 14 In short, the private sector still invests little.
Without a deeper reform of the investment climate, businesses are unlikely to lift spending on new plant and equipment (World Bank, 2005c) . 13 The surplus is largely remittances-driven, see Figure 22 . 14 Government securities now comprise about a third of the banks' portfolio. (Table 2 and Table 3 ).
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Indeed, the corporate élite -comfortably protected by political ties -finds convenient investing only a portion of its revenues in-country, and keeps sending considerable portions offshore. b. Second, the capital-intensive private sector expects low returns and does not want to expand investment at the economy's fast pace. MPK is low, for two reasons: i) the public sector does not invest enough to provide incentives for private investment (as the return to private investment depends on both quantity and quality of public capital spending); and ii) inputs are expensive because of élite-capture in the traditional sectors of the economy (agriculture, sea and air transport, power, cement, mining, banking, etc). There, the politically-connected corporate conglomerates, protected by favorable rules and regulations, enjoy barriers to entry and market power, and hence sell at a high price their products (agricultural commodities, transport services, electricity, cement, etc.), which are critical inputs for both upstream and downstream sectors; and c. Third, the fast-growing businesses in the service sector (electronics assembly, voicebased BPO, and ICT), do not need to increase their investment at GDP growth rates to enjoy fast-rising profits.
2a. The public sector cannot invest
20. As the Government struggles with severe fiscal pressures, public investment keeps falling. Decades of weak revenue performance, demanding debt service and fiscal constraints -along with a high cost of inputs, particularly for electricity, and an ineffective service delivery -led to expenditure compression; as a result, the Government underinvested in infrastructure. Similar constraints have undermined the quality of education, historically a point of strength in the Philippines 16 , and health (Table 4) . 21. In 2002-05, deficit reduction was driven primarily by expenditure compression. In recent years, despite the large spending needs, infrastructure and social spending growth has been slow (Table 4 ). In these key sectors, spending levels declined both as a share of GDP, as a share of the total budget, and on a per capita basis. Roads maintenance, an item with high economic return, was consistently under-funded.
22. In 2006, policy credibility improved … The bulk of the adjustment was due to the implementation of the VAT reforms 17 . The fiscal consolidation fostered macroeconomic 16 The lack of resources available for both basic and higher education is already resulting in poor mathematics and science scores in international comparisons, and a declining proficiency in English (World Bank, 2005c 20 23. … but the fiscal adjustment might be too recent to convince investors. The increase in the 2006 tax effort reflected implementation of the VAT reforms, while the collection of (corporate and personal) income taxes and excise taxes was insufficient. The public-debt-to-GDP ratio remains high at about 77 percent, the fiscal position is still fragile and significant interest payments (Table 4 ) still expose the economy to swings in financial market sentiment.
Hence, containing the risk premium with further tax efforts and steady progress on reforms is crucial. Concerns about the long history of macroeconomic volatility, the unsettled political climate, and (the unpredictability in the incidence of) corruption add to risks for investors (World Bank, 2005c) .
2b. The capital-intensive private sector does not want to invest
24. The expectations on future profitability of investment are low. The capital-intensive private sector does not want to increase investment because it expects low returns (World Bank, 2005c) . In the corporate sector, the MPK -calculated as market value/asset value, that is the Tobin's Q -has been falling since the early 1990s, and, since the Asian crisis, it has been lower than in neighboring countries ( Figure 11 ). 21 Despite the more favorable investment environment, the demand for domestic credit has been falling and the banks have been reluctant to lend ( Figure 12 ). Indeed, a low MPK reduces the expectations about future profitability and thus the willingness to invest, and, over the years, has contributed to the decline of fixed investment.
18 Spreads for government borrowing have fallen along with inflation. 19 Equity prices are approaching their pre-Asian crisis highs. 20 The Philippine stock market was among the top East Asian performers, and in early 2007 continued to rise towards pre-Asian crisis highs. 21 Aquino (2003) calculates the Tobin's Q of the Filipino corporate sector. While the firms with higher Tobin's Q can more easily and less expensively finance their investment with external financing, firms with low Tobin's Q are considered to have lower growth potential and the market might require higher external finance premiums in raising funds. This analysis, however, occurred when equity prices were considerably lower than current levels. 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 25. Why a low productivity of capital? In the traditional sectors of the economy, several rent-seeking corporate conglomerates, controlled by the local élite, use their political connections to: a) hinder tax collection, hence hampering public capital spending (which is a necessary condition for private investment: for example, the availability of public infrastructure is essential to stimulate the private sector's willingness to invest); and b) limit economic entry, drive potential investors out, discourage smaller firms to grow bigger, produce expensive inputs, and enjoy market power and oligopolistic rents. As a result, MPK is low because of: i) insufficient public investment; and ii) a high cost of inputs, due to élite capture ( Figure 13 ).
26. Oligopolies further reduce the investment appetite. Operating as monopolies and oligopolies, the corporate conglomerates find convenient to restrict production -and investment -below the competitive level. 22 Also, their willingness to invest is inhibited by their concentrated ownership structure, and their uncertainties about the stability and duration of government favoritism. 
2bi. Insufficient public investment

Low public investment is a bottle-neck for private investment. Compared with its
Asian neighbors, the country ranks low in transport comparisons (railroads, port, and air), and educational achievement. The declining quantity and quality of public investment, especially in infrastructure and education, provide little incentives for private investment and constitutes a bottle-neck to long-term economic growth. For example -according to the "organized corruption" was not replaced by a predictable system of rules, regulations, and contract enforcement. In other words, the country moved from "organized" to "disorganized corruption". 
Firms
K-intensive Sectors:
Oligopolies • Agriculture (rice) • Transport • Power & cement • Mining &
2bii. Expensive inputs
28. In traditional sectors, corporate conglomerates benefit from dominant positions. In the capital-intensive sectors of the economy, the key corporate conglomerates -profiting from a mode of production surviving from the country's historical past -use their political connections to create rents, by limiting economic entry and selling their products at a high price. Since all industries in the economy, to be able to produce and grow, require inputs from agriculture, maritime and air transport, power, cement, banking, etc., these sectors are strategic; indeed, they have multiple backward and forward linkages (Hirschman, 1958) . For example, transport has both backward and forward linkages for manufacturing.
29. Expensive inputs limit domestic investment. As the cost of the strategic inputs is inflated by élite capture, investment remains low. In the agricultural sector, farmers do not invest because of the expensive inputs, the poor access to credit, and the incomplete land reform program. In manufacturing, investors are reluctant because of the costs of complying with regulations, especially related to customs, trade, and labor markets, corruption, and uncertainty in economic policies (World Bank, 2005c) . Also the level of FDI (Figure 4) remains below the norm for Southeast Asia.
30. Agricultural commodities are protected ... Government support to agriculture, which accounts for 36 percent of employment, is the result of both a long-standing favoritism to large land-owners 24 and strong sentiments for the (still unrealized) goal of food selfsufficiency. Over the last two decades, domestic rice prices have consistently been kept 24 The skewed land distribution stems from the colonial period.
above the world price ( Figure 14) . 25 Corn, sugar, poultry, and the livestock industry receive even higher levels of protection.
31. … and risk taking is not rewarded. The well-connected have easier and relatively unscrutinized access to credit, as banks -usually associated to the key conglomerates -do not thoroughly assess the expected returns on their investment; as a result of their inadequate knowledge to pick "winners", average or mediocre projects get implemented. On the other hand, farmers under-invest in high-risk but high-return crops because they cannot afford insurance. 33. Port operations largely remain a monopoly. Philippines' ports are rated as the least competitive among those in eight major Asian countries (World Economic Forum, 2004) .
Until the reforms in the 1990s, port development and operation was a government monopoly; only a few private ports were allowed to operate commercially. Today, most ports are public, administered by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA). The sector suffers from a lack of credibility in pursuing open and fair competition between ports and among port operators.
34. The airline sector is also highly concentrated and oligopolistic. reflecting lack of competition -local prices are amongst the highest (Table 6 ) and per-capitaconsumption amongst the lowest in East Asia (Table 7) . 37. The nature of growth is becoming less capital-intensive. While in recent years the investment in manufacturing has been consistently declining, the investment in services was stable, and -despite its relatively low level -able to support the sector's steady growth ( Figure 16 ). As the service sector is less investment-intensive than industry, future economic growth is compatible with lower investment rates than implied by historical data. To enjoy 31 The top three firms -the multinationals Holcim, LaFarge and Cemex -account for nearly 90 percent of installed clinker capacity of 22mn tones, while four independent producers account for the rest. Between 2000 and 2005, when demand fell, cement producers increased prices by as much as 75 percent. 32 Mining -despite its untapped potential -witnessed a contraction.
rising profits, the service sector does not need to increase investment faster than GDP growth rates. 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 43. Qualified workers are increasingly moving overseas (Table 8) . Wage-setting does not reflect supply and demand. Despite the higher wages in the service sector (Figure 18 ), 32.3 percent of the unemployed were high-school graduates and 18.4 percent were college graduates. 44. As oligopolistic rents secure "national labor peace", the formal labor market is for well-paid insiders… Recent comparisons suggest that local wages tend to be high for the unskilled workers (Figure 19 ) and the skilled ones (Figure 20) . By paying higher wagesrelative to other Asian countries -to the salaried insiders, the politically-connected corporate conglomerates use the rents resulting from the Government's preferential treatment 34 to stabilize the economic system, secure "national labor peace", and perpetuate the status quo. 
What is the result?
The economy is in a "Low-Capital-Stock" equilibrium 50. No economic agent with rational foresight has incentives to unilaterally raise investment. The public sector cannot jeopardize macroeconomic stability. The domestic private sector is profitable in the status quo. The international private sector is reluctant to settle in a highly-protected business environment. Competition is undermined by regulatory capture of major agencies, which increases unpredictability in regulatory policy, adding to investor uncertainty (World Bank, 2005c) . When deciding to increase investment, the firstmover bears short-term costs, and faces strong disincentives.
51. In the medium term, the public sector does not have the resources to significantly step up investment. While public investment has been very low in recent years, today, if tax collection continues to improve, falling interest-payments-to-GDP would allow for rising public investment within a balanced budget framework. However, in the next few years the Government is likely to keep its expenditures in check, continue its fiscal consolidation, and focus on reducing macroeconomic volatility.
52. The domestic private sector makes enough money within the status quo, and is reluctant to invest. In the domestic private sector, investment is low because of the combined effect of two factors. On the one hand, the capital-intensive sectors -dominated by well-protected monopolistic and oligopolistic insiders, and facing a low MPK -restrict production below the competitive level. 36 On the other hand, in the non-capital-intensive sectors businesses are very profitable -and fast-growing -with relatively little investment efforts (Figure 16 ).
53. Foreign investors "stay out" and non-élite businesses "stay small and informal".
What is described above results in barriers to the entry of potential investors into the economy. For foreign investors -discouraged by a net of privileges and protections (e.g., in
the banking sector and in the formal labor market), by policy-driven competitiveness shortcomings (i.e., the effects of agricultural and industrial protection) and by the lack of resources for education and training -the incentives are to stay out. For the small firms, not belonging to the corporate élite, the incentives are to stay small and not to become formal (Figure 25 -B) .
54. The economic system is in equilibrium at a low-level of capital stock. The country is growing at a quick pace despite the low savings 37 and low investment. The status quo, far from being optimal, "works", and will keep underlying the economic fundamentals in the short-medium term. Economic growth comes -and, will very likely keep coming -from "not-capital intensive" activities, mainly services, and from consumption, spurred by remittances. In the traditional sectors, the conglomerates enjoy the rents granted by limited economic entry, and through high wages rents keep buying "national labor peace" (Figure 25 -E). This, coupled with the heavy protections in the formal labor market ( remittances -arriving mainly from the Gulf and the US -will foster consumption and spur growth via multiplier . As a result, the growth pattern -although not creating jobs -seems sustainable in the short-medium tem.
37 Public savings are in short supply because of the low tax collection, household savings are minimal because of the combined effect of the low salaries in the informal sector and the incoming flow of remittances, and corporate savings suffer the low productivity of the capital and labor. Additionally, only a portion of the savings of the corporate élite is invested in-country, while considerable portions are invested offshore. 5. Why is this a concern? Growth could be faster and more inclusive 56. The economy needs to move from its "low-capital-stock" equilibrium to a higher one. The "low-capital-stock" equilibrium is good for the well-protected conglomerates, but is it good for the country? Undeniably, the status quo is delivering economic growth, but it is difficult to see how -in the longer term -a sufficiently robust growth can be sustained at present levels of investment. In other words, today's inadequate investment is curtailing a speedier and more inclusive economic growth, which is essential to deal with the country's longer term development challenges (i.e., generate more jobs and reduce poverty). In order to achieve such growth, the Philippines need to reach a "high-capital-stock" steady state.
57. The country's growth potential is untapped. Strategic growth opportunities are lost. If compared with the booming East Asian neighborhood, the Philippines has had, and -in the status quo -is projected to have, a more modest trajectory (World Bank, 2007) . To reach its growth potential and sustain it in the long term, the economy needs to take better advantage of its geographical location and -by offering appealing opportunities within the regional context -attract more domestic and foreign investment to its core sectors. But to deliver faster growth, the country needs to address its lack of competitiveness. 58. The Philippines can hardly compete with its neighbors. For instance, the labor market is far from competitive. Relative to the other East Asian countries, due to a higher wage structure, unit labor costs are higher for broad ranges of manufacturing, and the country is finding it difficult to compete with lower wage economies particularly at the unskilled end of manufacturing. Additionally, the growth of output-per-worker is markedly lower (World Bank, 2007) . . 40 In recent years, banking sector vulnerabilities were addressed but credit to the private sector has continued to decline in real terms. Asset quality is still below regional and world standards but banking sector vulnerabilities were reduced via the take out of non-performing loans and assets from commercial bank balance sheets. wholesale and retail trade, accounted for two thirds of the employment gain, and agriculture a quarter. In 2006, employment growth slowed to 2 percent, below the growth of the working age population. 61. For the past few years, poverty reduction has been slower than in the rest of East Asia (Figure 29) , and rural poverty remains high. In the Philippines, 70 percent of the poor live in rural areas. However, the agricultural sector -traditionally more protected than the rest of the economy (David, Intal, Balisacan, 2007) -is not reducing poverty. In the past years, agricultural GDP grew at modest rates, productivity growth was low by regional standards 41 , and labor productivity and yield stagnated. The recent agrarian reform -while successful in transferring income and wealth from landlords to tenants -did not have a significant pro-poor impact (Balisacan and Fuwa, 2007) , as the benefits bypassed landless agricultural laborers (Hayami, Quisimbing, and Adriano, 1990). 42 62. The sustainability of the growth model is exposed to longer term risks. In the long run, of the two engines of growth (export-led services and remittances-fuelled consumption), 41 Between 1980 and 1998, total agricultural factor productivity has grown at 9 percent, compared to 27 percent in Thailand and 49 percent in Indonesia (World Bank, 2007b) . 42 Indeed, to succeed, land reform needs to combine access to land, credit, and technology. 64. … to steadily build a pro-reform constituency. Given the strength of rent-seeking interests, the reform of oligopolistic practices in the traditional sectors of the economy can occur only gradually (Auty 2007, Auty and Pontara, 2008) . Over time, as a result of the three-pronged approach, the expanding competitive sectors should shrink the relative importance of patronage networks, and build -in association with the businesses that are currently bearing the costs of rent-seeking -a pro-reform political constituency.
6a. Pursue better-performing economic zones and a competitive exchange rate
65. For speedier growth, policies should promote the manufacturing -and export -of new and more sophisticated products. Cross country comparisons show that growth accelerations are associated with the production and export of non-traditional manufacturing and services, in other words the products "in demand" in the industrialized nations (Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik, 2005; Jones and Olken, 2005; Rodrik, 2006) . Hence, development policies should strategically promote a structural transformation toward these "more sophisticated" economic activities, by providing production incentives to new exportables (Rodrik, 2006) .
66.
A key starting point is improving the performance of the economic zones … In the Philippines, the track record of the economic zones is mixed (Box 1): while they attract FDI and generate the majority of exports of non-traditional manufacturing (semiconductors - Figure 23 ) and voice-based services (BPO or call centers - Figure 15 ), they have been far less successful than in other countries in finding their niche, attracting investment and fostering economic development.
Box 1. Getting the "ecozones" right
Economic zones: not always good news. Over the last three decades, several developing countries -when a rapid nation-wide reform of their governance was neither possible nor credible -created "economic zones" to promote trade, spur exports and stimulate economic development. These industrial enclaves created new employment and increased export flows. Thirty years ago, 80 economic zones in 30 countries generated about 1 million direct jobs and US$6 billion in exports; today, 3,000 economic zones operate in 120 countries, employ 50 million people and account for more than US$ 600 billion in exports. However, in quite a few cases, these zones had adverse effects: higher-than-expected construction and maintenance costs, unstable employment (offered mainly to unskilled and low-wage female labor), weak links to local manufacturers, insufficient transfers of know-how (i.e., labor or managerial skills) and technology, andthus -little domestic added value.
In the Philippines, the ecozones need to improve their performance. The Philippines was one of the first Asian countries in developing economic zones ("ecozones"). Today, the government-owned investment promotion agency (Philippine Economic Zone Authority -PEZA) supervises 41 private-owned and 4 government-owned ecozones. At first, these enclaves -conceived as a substitute for a good investment climate and designed to operate separately from the surrounding communities -offered "imported institutions" to new exporters (i.e., producers of non-traditional manufacturing, voice-based ICT services). However, their inadequate legal and regulatory framework resulted in a lack of fully competitive conditions, and large investors -not expecting sufficient returns to compensate their risks -have been reluctant to settle in. Additionally, the ecozones often offer distortionary incentives, which add to the Government's fiscal burden (i.e., a considerable amount of existing revenue is lost through tax avoidance).
What makes an economic zone successful? Only well-designed and effectively run economic zones can lead to additional infrastructure, FDI, employment, foreign exchange earnings, transfers of new technologies and skills, and -as a result -national revenues and economic growth. To be successful, a zone must lie in a geographically defined area, where domestic and foreign agents can find: (i) first-rate infrastructure and human capital; (ii) investment incentives and simplified procedures; (iii) domestic and international linkages; (iv) enabling institutions, such as -for instance -an equal treatment of domestic and foreign firms, and transparent dispute reconciliation mechanisms; and (v) coordination with a comprehensive country-wide reform, in the context of an overall growth strategy. Examples are the Export Processing Zones in Singapore and Malaysia in the 1970s, and the Special Economic Zones in China, in the 1980s and 1990s.
Source: Devereux and Chen, 1985; Rondinelli, 1987; Blomström and Kokko, 2003. 67. … while pursuing a stable and competitive real effective exchange rate 43 . Despite the current incentives of the Central Bank (favorable to an appreciating exchange rate because of the large dollar-denominated external debt and its effects on income statements), a volatile and appreciated currency is not conducive to the expansion of new exportables, and negatively affects the production of tradables (Williamson, 2003; Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2007) . Hence, to foster the diversification of the industrial base, to induce investment and entrepreneurship in tradables, and to promote the production and export of non-traditional manufacturing and services, it is necessary to pursue a stable and competitive real effective exchange rate (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 2003; Rodrik, 2006 and 2007a) .
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Box 2. Getting the exchange rate right A competitive exchange rate helps achieving rapid and sustained growth. In the past decades, fastgrowing developing countries have simultaneously exhibited not-overvalued real exchange rates, high domestic savings, and current account surpluses. China is the present-day example, but in recent years this was the case also in high-performing Asian economies such as Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, as well as in Chile. The opposite (an appreciated real exchange rate, low domestic saving, current account deficits -and low growth) is also recognized in the international experience (e.g., Mexico in 1993, Russia and Brazil in 1998, and Argentina and Turkey in 2000) .
The boost in aggregate demand accelerates investment and employment. Assuming no supply constraints (i.e., local growth is not constrained by a lack of supply capacity, but by a shortage of demand), a competitive exchange rate increases demand for exports and import substitutes, and motivates entrepreneurs to produce non-traditional export commodities, expanding investment, employment, and economic grow. Conversely, when capital inflows appreciate the real exchange rate, growth gets hurt by reduced investment incentives.
Source : Balassa 1984; Williamson, 2003; Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian, 2007; Rodrik, 2006 and 2007a. 68. How to do it? To help identifying "what the country is good at producing" (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003) and, consequently, foster investments and determine the pattern of specialization, PEZA should make convincing commitments to improving the performance of the economic zones. In particular, it should: (i) provide non-fiscal incentives to the construction in loco of first-rate infrastructure -e.g., via public-private-partnerships (PPPsee paragraph 70 page 40); (ii) guarantee simplified business procedures; (iii) enhance in situ 43 See footnote 3 page 7. 44 China and India have made a "stable and competitive real exchange rate" an explicit policy objective (Rodrik, 2006) . competition, by ensuring -for example -that local institutions treat domestic and foreign firms equally and transparently (e.g., in dispute reconciliation); and (iv) coordinate this "ecozones strengthening process" within an overall growth strategy. 45 As a result, betterperforming economic zones will create new wealth and bring about efficiency gains -without forcing an immediate redistribution of oligopolistic profits. Then, the investment in nontraditional activities will increase, and provide demonstration effects for prospective entrants.
Over time, the enhanced dynamism of the export-oriented sector will diffuse beyond the original location, acting as a catalyst for reform of the economy as a whole (Rodrik, 2006) .
Finally, to support both the stability and the competitiveness of the real exchange-rate, the Government should stimulate higher saving rates (Williamson, 2003 , Rodrik, 2007a 6b. Increase revenues, to finance spending in infrastructure and education 69. Additional revenues and more public-private risk sharing in infrastructure and education. Over the years, the lack of infrastructure and education is becoming an evident bottleneck to growth, as it hurts small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and discourages entry and investment of domestic start-ups and foreign investors. As the extra spending in infrastructure and skills upgrades needs public resources, more revenues are needed -via a stronger tax administration and additional tax policy reform -to maintain a sound fiscal policy; at the same time, public spending efficiency needs to improve. As private investment is constrained by a number of institutional factors that are difficult to address in the short run,
to alleviate bottlenecks the Government should both: (i) reduce the risk for; and (ii) increase the return on private investment, starting from the ecozones.
How to do it?
To finance additional public spending, the Government should increase its revenues as a share of GDP by strengthening tax administration and adjusting excise taxes, continue lowering the debt-to-GDP ratio and interest payments, and restrain non-priority current expenditures. To increase tax collection, the taxpayer register should include the corporate conglomerates and tax arrears should be audited. Indexation would ensure that excise revenues do not decline in real terms: excises on fuel, alcohol, and tobacco are low by international standards and have not kept up with inflation since the tax reform of 1997 (IMF, 2006b ). Finally, starting from the economic zones, it is necessary to stimulate risk-sharing among investors -for example, via PPP in infrastructure, by co-financing public works (transport and communications) and in education, by addressing under-provision of training in areas where skills are lacking.
6c. Gradually reduce élite-capture, to lower the cost of strategic inputs 71. In the traditional sectors, the rent-seekers are powerful and well established. In the Philippines, the status quo has historical roots: the colonial distribution of factor endowments determined the power and incentives of self-interested political constituencies, which, in equilibrium, profit from oligopolistic privileges and perpetuate them. Well-established in sectors that are strategic because of multiple backward and forward linkages, the conglomerates -by producing expensive inputs -skim rents from the economy and shrink the margins of the potentially most dynamic agents: the small and medium domestic private producers. They also control bank credit and dominate state procurement contracts through political connections.
72. Less élite-capture in agriculture, maritime and air transport, electricity, and cement. To attract investment in the capital-intensive sectors, the corporate conglomerates should be restrained in their use of political connections, and their rents should be trimmed down by reduced economic protection. For example, promoting competition in the agriculture sector would lower prices, improve competitiveness in the food processing and livestock industries, increase disposable incomes for the poor and enhance labor market domestic capital in the maritime and air transport industries, with the resolution of conflicts of interests and a comprehensive deregulation. Promoting competition in electricity generation and transmission would enhance operational efficiency, achieve financial viability, and augment long-term power supply capacity. To strengthen the investment climate and support market competition in the cement sector, it is necessary to reduce the cost of doing business through simplification of approval procedures. Also, in all mentioned sectors regulatory capacity and oversight needs to be enhanced.
To accelerate economic growth, increase employment generation, and generate public resources for social programs, rent seeking by the élites that exercise political and economic power -or "élite capture" -must be addressed. First steps are improving the investment climate and competitiveness, and disseminating information on the distributional effects of government policies. But the key measure to attract raising investment and create more local jobs is opening and reforming the sectors dominated by rent-seeking corporate conglomerates.
74.
As shown by the de-monopolization of telecommunications, it is possible …. The untapped potential for growth is illustrated by the deregulation of the telecom industry (Box 3). 47 Until the 1990s, the politically-connected Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) operated as a monopoly, and -in spite of the rising demand for phone lines -spent more resources in protecting its rents than in expanding its network. When the deregulation was announced, PLDT tried to block prospective entrants to safeguard its dominant market share, but was unsuccessful. By granting entry to domestic and foreign players, the reform spurred investment, created employment, and -over a decadetransformed first the industry and then the economy. 46 Food, and rice in particular, comprises a large share of the consumption basket of low income workers. Allowing rice prices to adjust towards the border price would benefit the majority of the population and the majority of the poor. 47 Another example has been, between 1995 and 2005, the liberalization of foreign-carriers-entry into the airline sector (paragraph 34 and footnote 28 and 29, page21).
Box 3. The telecommunications boom
In the 1990s, telecoms were opened to competition. In 1990, despite the estimated 800,000 applicants, the sole dominant provider (PLDT) took years to install a line, and tele-density was at 1 per 100 persons. The deregulation shook the industry, from the dominance of a single operator to increased market competition, dynamism and vastly improved access to telecommunication services. By 2006, there were 6.5 million fixed lines installed, tele-density had climbed to 7.7 and the waiting time for phone service was measured in days. Mobile penetration grew exponentially, from 3 million mobile phones in 1999 to over 35 million in 2006. New investors came steadily into the market, which now counts on 73 local exchange carriers, 11 international gateway facilities (IGFs), 7 mobile telephones, 14 inter-carriers, and 388 valueadded service (VAS) providers.
Today one of the most dynamic industries, telecommunication employs more than 20,000 people. The Philippines is now an important location for new growth industries such as BPO, medical transcription and call centers, and other IT-enabled retail services, such as mobile-phone-based business solutions (e.g., through mobile phones, remittances charges are 1 percent of the average remittance value, while banks charge up to six times more). By 2006, the sector accounted for 5 percent of GDP, corporate profits had increased to $3.3 billion, and an estimated 235,000 jobs are found in industries that have benefited from the telecoms reforms.
Source: Mirandilla 2006 , World Bank, 2007 , Bernardo and Tang, 2007 75. … but leadership matters. To break monopolies and increase competition in protected sectors, a clear vision, political will, and a coherent implementation strategy are needed (Bernardo and Tang, 2007) . 48 In agriculture, import protection for rice should be gradually reduced, and public investments should be geared towards reducing farmers' marketing and transaction costs. The NFA should devolve its rice trade functions to the private sector and focus on market regulation. In the transport sector, to promote full competition in foreign containerized cargo operations, ports and airlines licensing should be increased. The PPA's port development and operating functions should be separated from its regulatory function.
The aviation sector should be liberalized further, as competition would reduce airfares and increase the number of tourists. Greater access to bank lending for unconnected companies (foreign corporations, domestic medium and small firms) should be promoted. The government should open the domestic market to cement imports, to contain price increases, and simplify the numerous regulatory, land, quarrying and environmental clearances required in setting up a cement plant, to encourage new domestic and foreign entrants. Finally, a reform of the labor market is overdue, by removing protections, streamlining enforcement agencies, and lowering wage pressures. 48 According to Bernardo and Tang (2007) , the electoral rules should attract qualified candidates and select contenders that think long-term.
